

**Report
Of The
Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group
On
General Aviation Airports Security**

Purpose of this Report

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) requested the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) establish a Working Group made up of industry stakeholders to develop guidelines for security enhancements at the nation's privately and publicly owned and operated general aviation (GA) landing facilities. This listing of recommended guidelines or "best practices" is designed to establish non-regulatory standards for general aviation airport security.

The Working Group represents the overwhelming majority of those engaged in the general aviation industry on the important issue of ensuring the continued security of the nation's general aviation (i.e., non-regulated) landing facilities and airports.

Working Group members participating in creating these guidelines are:

- Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association;
- Airport Consultants Council;
- American Association of Airport Executives;
- Experimental Aircraft Association;
- General Aviation Manufacturers Association;
- Helicopter Association International;
- National Air Transportation Association;
- National Association of State Aviation Officials;
- National Business Aviation Association; and,
- United States Parachute Association.

Additionally, individuals representing specific general aviation airports and representatives of various state government aviation agencies fully participated in the working group's activities. Representatives from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the TSA also participated in the project.

It is the working group's expectation that this document will provide greater consistency for local security requirements involving airport owners, tenants and aircraft operators by providing a list of guidelines.

October 1, 2003

An important concept in developing and implementing these guidelines is avoiding any unfunded mandates to airports, states, general aviation businesses and pilots. Consequently, funding remains a major challenge in addressing many of the security enhancements contemplated by this group. Given the importance of general aviation to the nation's economy, decision-makers at the local, state and federal levels must provide additional resources to GA facilities. In particular, direct federal assistance, changes to the Airport Improvement Program (AIP) and other funding mechanisms merit attention. It is not the Working Group's intent that these security guidelines adversely affect or supplant AIP projects designed to enhance capacity or safety.

The AIP continues to bear a significant portion of the aviation security funding burden and, as those funds are expended primarily for commercial service facility security-related projects, the maintenance and vitality of current general aviation infrastructure dims. As increasingly larger slices of the AIP are used for security costs, many GA facilities are finding themselves unable to compete for and obtain shrinking slices of the pie dedicated to GA. There are currently no dedicated aviation trust funds or other funding sources available for enhancing GA security.

Lacking a comprehensive security risk assessment encompassing all transportation modes, it is important that general aviation not be isolated and required to follow security practices that are beyond those being followed as best practices by other modes of transportation.

Defining General Aviation

General aviation encompasses all civil aviation, except scheduled passenger service and the military. Some basic statistics available from the FAA and from the industry organizations participating in the Working Group demonstrate the breadth and depth of general aviation and its impact on the U.S. economy:

- More than 18,000 landing facilities nationwide serve general aviation, including heliports, lakes and dirt landing strips in remote wilderness areas as well as general aviation airports near urban settings that rival the size and scope of some air carrier airports.
- The more than 219,000 general aviation aircraft in the U.S. are responsible for 77% of all air traffic.
- These aircraft range from one-person "ultralights" and powered parachutes with extremely limited range and payload capabilities to helicopters, seaplanes, antiques, fabric-and-wood biplanes, "homebuilt" experimental airplanes, the ubiquitous four-seat single-engine airplane, twin turboprops, and large and small business jets.
- General aviation accounts for over 637,000 jobs, with nearly \$20 billion in annual earnings. Its direct and indirect economic impact exceeds \$102 billion annually.

October 1, 2003

- There are more than 600,000 certificated pilots in the U.S., most of whom conduct general aviation flight operations.
- General aviation transports approximately 180 million passengers annually in aircraft of all sizes for business and personal reasons.
- An estimated 65% of all general aviation flights are conducted for business and corporate travel.
- Commercial, non-scheduled flights (charters) are also a component of general aviation, with more than 22,000 pilots flying some 14,700 aircraft for this industry segment during 2001 alone.
- General aviation aircraft are used for a wide range of flight operations including personal/family transportation, training, MEDEVAC, transporting medical supplies, emergency services, rescue operations, wildlife surveys, traffic reporting, agricultural aviation and law enforcement.

Because of this wide variety and scope of aircraft and landing locations, any approach to implementing these security guidelines must consider the differing types of various flight operations as well as the size of aircraft involved, among other factors. As one result, a flexible, common-sense approach to general aviation airport security is mandatory if the industry is to retain its economic vitality and prosper.

Government Actions

Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has taken numerous actions related to aviation security. While the terrorist attacks of September 11 were not orchestrated using general aviation aircraft, the federal government nevertheless has taken actions that affect general aviation operators. These federal actions include the following:

Pilots

- **Advanced Screening of Pilot Databases.** Regulations adopted by the FAA and the TSA on January 24, 2003, permit the immediate suspension, revocation or refusal to issue an airman certificate to anyone that the TSA has determined poses a threat to transportation security. This is based on TSA information as well as that provided by other security agencies.
- **New Airman Certificate.** In July 2003, the Department of Transportation announced it would begin issuing a new, security-enhanced airman certificate. The difficult-to-counterfeit certificates include a hologram and graphics printed on a plastic card and replace a paper-based document.
- **Requirement to Carry Photo ID.** An FAA requirement, adopted in October 2002, requires a pilot to carry government-issued photo identification along with the pilot certificate when operating an aircraft.

October 1, 2003

- **Restrictions for Foreign Pilots.** There are current federal restrictions on flight training of foreign nationals, including a requirement for background checks for individuals seeking to receive a U.S. pilot certificate on the basis of a foreign pilot certificate. This requirement was put in place in July 2002.
- **Background Checks for Certain Flight Training.** A federal requirement mandates that the U.S. Department of Justice conduct a comprehensive background check for all non-U.S. citizens seeking flight training in aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds. Legislation expanding this requirement to include notification to the federal government of all foreign nationals seeking pilot training regardless of aircraft weight has been approved by Congress and is awaiting final action in the Conference Report accompanying the FAA reauthorization legislation (H.R. 2115).

Commercial Operators/Businesses

- **Charter Flight Security Program.** The Twelve-Five and Private Charter rules, which establish new requirements for non-scheduled commercial operators (charters) that provide a level of security equivalent to that of scheduled airlines, became effective April 1, 2003. The following table highlights some of the two programs' various elements:

Private Charter Program Requirements	Twelve-Five Program Requirements
Part 121 and 135 (U.S. aircraft operators) for flights to, from, within, and outside the U.S.	Part 121 and 135 (U.S. aircraft operators) for flights to, from, within, and outside the U.S.
Private charter (passenger) operations only.	Private charter (passenger), scheduled passenger and all-cargo operations.
(1) All aircraft for “sterile” (i.e., loading or unloading in certain areas of a commercial airport) operations. (2) Aircraft weighing 100,300 pounds or more, or 61 or more seats for “non-sterile” operations.	(1) Aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more for all-cargo operations. (2) Aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more, but less than 100,300 pounds for private charter (passenger) operations.
Passenger identification checks.	Passenger identification checks.
Fingerprint-based CHRC for flight deck crewmembers.	Fingerprint-based CHRC for flight deck crewmembers.
Bomb and hijack notification requirements.	Bomb and hijack notification requirements.
Additional measures protected as Sensitive Security Information.	Additional measures protected as Sensitive Security Information.

Charter flight operations are commonly considered to be part of general aviation, although much more stringent operational and certification requirements are imposed on them than is the case for non-commercial flights.

- **Flight School Security.** In January 2002, the FAA issued a number of recommended actions addressing security for flight schools and those renting aircraft. These recommendations are designed to provide security against the unauthorized use of a flight school or rental aircraft.

October 1, 2003

- **Flight School Security Awareness Training.** Also included in the pending Conference Report accompanying the FAA reauthorization legislation (H.R. 2115) is a requirement that employees be trained in “suspicious circumstances and activities of individuals enrolling or attending” a flight school.

Airports/Airspace

- **Washington DC ADIZ, FRZ and Department of Defense Airspace Restrictions.** Since September 11, the FAA and government officials have imposed airspace restrictions at various locations throughout the U.S. to limit or prohibit aircraft operations in certain areas when intelligence officials report heightened security sensitivity. This includes the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) around Washington, D.C., the associated Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ) and restrictions that are put into effect when the President travels outside of Washington D.C. These airspace restrictions are patrolled and enforced by U.S. Customs and U.S. military aircraft.
 - **Hotline to Report Suspicious Activity.** In December 2002, the TSA implemented a Hotline (1-866-GA-SECURE), which is operated 24/7 by the National Response Center managed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that allows anyone to report suspicious activity to a central command structure.
 - **Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport.** Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) remains closed to all general aviation operations except those few specifically permitted by waiver.
 - **Special Flight Rules Area within 15 miles of Washington DC.** Special Federal Aviation Regulation 94 (SFAR 94), implemented on February 19, 2002, prohibits general aviation operations within this 15-mile area unless authorized by the TSA. This limits access at Potomac Airpark, Washington Executive/Hyde Field and College Park Airport (referred to as the “DC-3”) to only cleared and vetted pilots operating in compliance with specific flight planning and ATC procedures.
 - **Limits on Flights Over Stadiums.** A pre-existing Notice to Airman (NOTAM) was updated on March 6, 2003, due to enactment of P.L. 108-7 that limits aircraft operations in the airspace over major sporting events. Commercial operators with a need to fly within 3 nautical miles and below 3,000 feet of an event stadium must apply for a waiver through the TSA and must complete a pilot vetting process to obtain that waiver. Banner towing operations are prevented from flying over major sporting events (college football, professional baseball and football, NASCAR and other specifically identified events). Other restrictions may be applied on a case-by-case basis when deemed appropriate by federal authorities, e.g., the 2002 Winter Olympics.
 - **No Flights Over Nuclear Facilities.** On February 26, 2003, a pre-existing NOTAM advising pilots not to circle or loiter over nuclear facilities was strengthened to reinforce the need for pilots to avoid these facilities altogether.
-

October 1, 2003

Industry Actions

Individual general aviation organizations have taken pro-active steps to increase security and security awareness. Aviation, while substantial in economic impact and number of operations, is relatively small when compared to other transportation modes such as maritime, rail or highways. As such, general aviation operators are keenly aware of and willing to individually enhance the security of their operations without government regulation. Given the ease and frequency of intrastate movement, combined with the wide variety of operations, measures taken by individual operators are more comprehensive than regulation at the state or federal level.

Following is a brief description of some, but not all, of the security-based actions and recommendations of these organizations in the last two years.

- **Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association.** The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association (AOPA) developed a nationwide aviation watch system (Airport Watch) using the nation's 650,000 pilots that is supported by the TSA centralized toll-free hotline and system for reporting and acting on information provided by general aviation pilots and other individuals at airports. *The Airport Watch Program* includes warning signs for airports, informational literature, and a training videotape to educate pilots and airport employees as to how the security of their airports and aircraft can be enhanced.
- **Airports & Airport Tenants.** Many airports and individual airport tenants have already implemented security enhancements in addition to the aforementioned *Airport Watch Program*. Such initiatives have included but are not limited to installing alarm systems, controlling access, monitoring and improving gates, fencing and lighting. Some airports are also experimenting with new technologies in security monitoring, surveillance and access control technologies, including WiFi and sophisticated target acquisition software programs.
- **American Association of Airport Executives.** The American Association of Airport Executives (AAAE) "General Aviation Airport Security Task Force" delivered a set of recommendations to the TSA in June 2002. The eight recommendations made by AA AE were developed by establishing categories of airports based on runway length and number of based aircraft. Recommendations also included securing aircraft, establishing a threat communication system, developing a new pilot license, securing aircraft, and expanding the FAA contract tower program.
- **Experimental Aircraft Association.** The Experimental Aircraft Association (EAA) mobilized its network of nearly 1000 chapters nationwide to improve security at many of the nation's airports through increased knowledge and vigilance. To support this effort, *Airport Watch* videotapes and other educational materials concerning security practices and airspace restrictions were distributed nationwide. In addition, Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs), often employing graphic depictions, are provided near-real-time to pilots via the association's Web site and direct e-mail, warning of security sensitive areas and

October 1, 2003

airport closures. EAA has led the development of new Sport Pilot and Light Sport Aircraft regulations which, in part, will have the positive security impact of registering with the FAA an estimated ten to fifteen thousand previously unregistered ultralight training aircraft and certificating a similar number of ultralight pilots and instructors that heretofore had not been part of the FAA certification process.

- **General Aviation Coalition.** In December 2001, the GAC issued a series of 12 recommendations for general aviation security. The government and the general aviation community have implemented many of these. In addition, the TSA conducts regular meetings with the GAC to address general aviation security issues.
- **General Aviation Manufacturers Association.** The General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA), in conjunction with the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is working to help aircraft sellers identify unusual financial transactions that could indicate attempts to launder money via the purchase of aircraft, or otherwise suspicious customer behavior. The publication entitled “Guidelines for Establishing Anti-Money Laundering Procedures and Practices Related to the Purchase of General Aviation Aircraft” was developed in consultation with manufacturers, aviation-finance companies, used aircraft brokers and fractional ownership companies.
- **National Agricultural Aircraft Association.** The National Agricultural Aircraft Association (NAAA) has produced an educational program called the Professional Aerial Applicators Support System (PAASS) that includes a new educational portion every year, specifically addressing security of aerial application operations. The PAASS program annually reaches roughly 2,000 people involved in aerial application. It is presented at state and regional agricultural aviation association meetings throughout the country. In addition, NAAA members have undergone several industry-wide FBI background investigations since 9/11/01.
- **National Air Transportation Association.** On September 24, 2001, the National Air Transportation Association (NATA) issued a series of recommended security procedures for all aviation businesses through its Business Aviation Security Task Force. The recommendations focused on immediate steps that should be taken, plus longer-term actions. Examples included signage, appointing a single manager responsible for security at all locations, developing a “security mission statement,” methods to verify identification, seeking local law enforcement assistance to develop a security plan and a host of others, including an advisory poster that was created and distributed free to all NATA members.
- **National Association of Flight Instructors.** The National Association of Flight Instructors (NAFI), an affiliate of EAA, has developed a series of security recommendations and best practices for flight schools and flight instructors that have been distributed widely throughout the flight training community. Currently, NAFI is working in cooperation with the TSA to develop training materials and distribution methods in support of the proposed flight school security awareness training

October 1, 2003

requirements contained in the pending Conference Report accompanying the FAA reauthorization legislation (H.R. 2115).

- **National Association of State Aviation Officials.** In December 2002, the National Association of State Aviation Officials (NASAO) submitted to federal and state authorities a document outlining general aviation security recommendations. This included securing unattended aircraft, developing a security plan, and establishing a means to report suspicious activity. In addition, airports should establish a public awareness campaign; perform regular inspection of airport property and control movement of persons and vehicles in the aircraft operating area. The state aviation officials suggested federal authorities implement a new pilot ID, establish a means to verify the identity of persons requesting flight lessons with a government watch list, implement a process for categorizing airports, and ensure adequate federal funding for airport security needs.
- **National Business Aviation Association.** The TSA launched a pilot project in cooperation with the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA) at Teterboro Airport (KTEB) in New Jersey. This has been expanded by the TSA to include Part 91 operators based at Morristown, New Jersey, (KMMU) and White Plains, New York, (KHPN). This initiative is proceeding as a “proof-of-concept” validating an NBAA-proposed security protocol for Part 91 operators who can apply for a TSA Access Certificate (TSAAC). Once issued, the TSAAC allows operators to operate internationally without the need for a waiver. The TSA is also considering granting access for TSAAC holders to designated TFRs.
- **United States Parachute Association.** USPA disseminated detailed security recommendations to its 219 skydiving clubs and centers across the U.S., most of them based on general aviation airports. Skydive operators and their customers are often on airports during days and hours when others are not, and can enhance any airport watch program. Other recommendations were aimed at ensuring security of jump aircraft during operations as well as periods when aircraft are idle.

Methodology

Members of the Working Group met six times throughout the summer of 2003 and engaged in extensive discussions to review numerous general aviation airport security recommendations, including those “industry best practices” mentioned above. In each instance, Working Group members collectively evaluated each recommendation for its appropriateness and its effect on enhancing general aviation airport security. One result of these efforts is the guidelines included herein. Their primary purpose is to help prevent the unauthorized use of a general aviation aircraft in an act of terrorism against the United States, an event which has never before occurred.

October 1, 2003

The Working Group's recommendations are focused on listing those guidelines the federal government should recommend to airport managers and operators to enhance the security of their facility.

The Working Group focused on no-cost or low-cost guidelines, in large measure due to the lack of federally appropriated funds for general aviation security and the resultant adverse economic impact that would otherwise be imposed on general aviation airports. Any unfunded mandates will have a significant impact on communities that own general aviation airports, GA airport operators, GA tenants and users alike. In particular, unfunded mandates will have the most impact where the relationship between cost and benefit remain poorly understood.

Implementation

Managers and operators of general aviation airports are encouraged to use the recommended guidelines in this report to enhance the security of their respective facilities. When considering the scope and breadth of these recommendations, it may be helpful to develop a written security protocol. Such a protocol should minimally consist of, but not be limited to, airport and local law enforcement contact information, including alternates when available. More extensive protocols may call for, but not be limited to, emergency locator maps, entrance locations and response procedures.

Each written general aviation security protocol should include reference to and be coordinated with appropriate local response plans as prepared for the specific region in which the landing facility is located. The protocol should emphasize such critical elements as awareness, prevention, preparation, response and recovery.

Intrinsic in these recommended guidelines is the concept that each general aviation airport is unique. As a result, the Working Group went to great lengths to make these recommendations relevant to each airport and landing facility, whether it is adjacent to a major metropolitan area or situated in a remote area.

As one result, these recommendations are both broad in their scope and generic in their application. Each and every general aviation airport and landing facility operator throughout the U.S. may use them to evaluate that facility's physical security, procedures, infrastructure and resources.

October 1, 2003

Recommendations

The following specific recommendations were selected in assisting the local aviation community in the development of a tiered but flexible security plan given available resources, alert levels and potential threats.

Personnel

Passengers

- Prior to boarding, the Pilot In Command should ensure that the identity of all occupants is verified, all occupants are aboard at the invitation of the owner/operator, and that all baggage and cargo is known to the occupants.

Pilots

- Pilots must be able to provide government-issued photo identification.

Student Pilots

- Control aircraft ignition keys so that the student cannot start the aircraft until the instructor is ready for the flight to begin or
 - Limit student pilot access to aircraft keys until the student pilot has reached an appropriate point in the training curriculum; or,
 - Consider having any student pilot check in with a specific employee (i.e. dispatcher, aircraft scheduler, flight instructor, or other "management" official) before being allowed access to parked aircraft; or,
 - Have the student sign or initial a form and not receive keys until an instructor or other "management official" also signs or initials; or,
 - When available, use a different ignition key from the door lock key. The instructor would provide the ignition key when he or she arrives at the aircraft.

Flight Schools and Aircraft Renters

- The identity of an individual renting an aircraft should be verified by checking a government-issued photo ID as well as the airman certificate and current medical certificate (if necessary for that operation).

October 1, 2003

- In addition to any aircraft-specific operational and training requirements, a first-time rental customer should be familiarized with local airport operations, including security procedures used at the facility.
- Operators renting aircraft should be aware of suspicious activities and report to appropriate officials individuals who inquire about aircraft rental without possessing the necessary knowledge or certifications to operate such an aircraft.

Transient Pilots

- Sign-in/sign-out procedures for all transient operators identifying their parked aircraft.

Aircraft

Securing Aircraft

- Pilots should make it as difficult as possible for an unauthorized person to gain access to their airplane. This would include using existing mechanisms such as door locks, keyed ignitions, hanging the aircraft or using an auxiliary lock to further protect aircraft from unauthorized use. Commercially available options for auxiliary locks include locks for propellers, throttle, and prop controls, and tie-downs. Locking hangar doors and aircraft doors to prevent unauthorized access or tampering with the aircraft is important.

Airports/Facilities

Airport Vehicle Access

- Consider reasonable vehicle access control to facilities and ramps, which may include signage, fencing, gates or positive control techniques. This may include restricting access to the airside to as few locations as possible, balancing the need for authorized access with access control.
 - Where there is access control, periodically review access authorization – including codes, cards and locks – to vehicular and pedestrian gates leading to airside.

Lighting

- Consider installing effective outdoor area lighting to help improve the security of (a) aircraft parking and hangar areas; (b) fuel storage areas, (c) airport access points; and other appropriate areas. Proximity sensors should be considered.

October 1, 2003

Hangars

- Secure hangar/personnel doors when unattended.

Signage

- It is recommended that airports post appropriate signage. Wording may include – but is not limited to – warnings against trespassing, unauthorized use of aircraft and tampering with aircraft, as well as reporting of suspicious activity. Signage should include phone numbers of the nearest responding law enforcement agency, 9-1-1, or TSA’s 1-866-GA-SECURE, whichever is appropriate.

Surveillance

Airport Community Watch Program

- Establish an Airport Watch Program (These recommendations are not all inclusive. Additional measures that are specific to your airport should be added as appropriate.)
 - Utilize AOPA Airport Watch Program; and/or
 - Develop similar watch program to include the following items, if appropriate:
 - ✓ Coordinate locally with airport officials, pilots, businesses and/or other airport users.
 - ✓ Hold periodic meetings with the airport community.
 - ✓ Develop and circulate reporting procedures to all who have a regular presence on the airport.
 - ✓ Encourage proactive participation in aircraft and facility security and heightened awareness measures. This should encourage airport and line staff to ‘query’ unknowns on ramps, near aircraft, etc.
 - ✓ Post signs promoting the program, warning that the airport is watched. Include appropriate emergency phone numbers on the sign.
 - ✓ Provide training to all involved for recognizing suspicious activity and appropriate response tactics.
 - This could include the use of a video or other media for training. The following are some recommended training topics:
 - Transient aircraft with unusual or unauthorized modifications.

October 1, 2003

- Persons loitering for extended periods in the vicinity of parked aircraft, in pilot lounges, or other inappropriate areas.
 - Pilots who appear to be under the control of another person.
 - Persons wishing to rent aircraft without presenting proper credentials or identification.
 - Persons who present apparently valid credentials but who do not display a corresponding level of aviation knowledge.
 - Any pilot who makes threats or statements inconsistent with normal uses of aircraft.
 - Events or circumstances that do not fit the pattern of lawful, normal activity at an airport.
- ✓ Utilize local law enforcement for airport security community education.
 - ✓ It is recommended that airports post appropriate signage. Wording may include – but is not limited to – warnings against trespassing; unauthorized use of aircraft; and tampering with aircraft, as well as reporting suspicious activity. Signage should include phone numbers of the nearest responding law enforcement agency, 9-1-1 or TSA’s 1-866-GA-SECURE whichever is appropriate.
- Encourage employers to make their staff aware of the airport watch programs.

Law Enforcement Officer Support

- Develop procedures to have security patrols for ramp and aircraft hangar and parking areas. Special considerations should be made during periods of heightened security.
- Airport operators should communicate and educate local law enforcement agencies on security procedures at the airport. This could include:
 - What does a pilot license look like;
 - Who is authorized to drive on the ramp;
 - How do you get airport access (who has key);and
 - What are “normal” operations.

October 1, 2003

Security Plans & Communications

Security Plan

- Create an emergency locator map. Identify gates, hydrants, emergency shelters, buildings and hazardous materials sites on a grid map. Provide fire and law enforcement with a copy of the map. Also, establish a procedure for handling bomb threats and suspect aircraft.

Threat Communication System

- Develop a tiered comprehensive local phone and contact list and distribute on a need-to-know basis. Include the following 24-hour phone numbers on the contact list:
 - Airport Director
 - Point of Contact or Airport Security Coordinator
 - Local Police or County Sheriff Department (List all responding LEO Agencies)
 - County/City Emergency Manager
 - State Police
 - Fire Department
 - State Office of Public Security
 - FBI, FAA or TSA
 - Any other appropriate organization

Where possible, establish radio communication capabilities with local law enforcement.


- The TSA and industry shall post these best practices on their respective Web sites and related information about securing aircraft and airport facilities. Existing security courses available from industry should be identified, including those from AAAE, AOPA, EAA, and NATA.
- Communicate and educate all new security policies and procedures when issued.
- Conduct regular meetings with airport tenants and the flying public to discuss the security issues and challenges.
- Have a qualified, single Point of Contact (POC) for disseminating security information.

October 1, 2003

Specialty Operations

Agricultural Aircraft Operations


- It is recommended that each owner/operator of agricultural aircraft take appropriate steps to secure the aircraft when unattended. Examples of existing mechanisms include throttle and control locks, propeller locks and hidden ignition switches. When storing aircraft, it is recommended that aircraft be stored in hangars with steel doors that are locked with electronic security systems. When hangars are not available for storage, it is recommended that heavy equipment be parked in the front and back of agricultural aircraft when not in use.



Andy Cebula
Senior VP for Government and Technical Affairs
Aircraft Owners & Pilots Association



Douglas C. Macnair
Vice President, Government Relations
Experimental Aircraft Association



J. Leonard Wood
Airport Consultants Council



Ronald L. Swanda
Vice President of Operations
General Aviation Manufacturers Association



Rebecca Khamneipur
Senior Director, Transportation Security Policy
American Association of Airport Executives




Richard M. Wright, Jr.
Manager of Administrative Services
Helicopter Association International

Report Of The Aviation Security Advisory Committee Working Group On General Aviation Airports Security


October 1, 2003



Joseph E. Burnside
Vice President
National Air Transportation Association



Henry M. Ogradzinski
President and CEO
National Association of State Aviation Officials



Robert P. Blouin
Senior Vice President, Operations
National Business Aviation Association



Ed Scott
Director of Government Relations
U.S. Parachute Association